The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC) has ruled that the lead judge who overturned the initial ruling in the COVID-19 vaccine mandate case in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) was not a justice of appeal at the time of the February 2025 ruling.
In a written judgment on July 7, High Court judge Raulston L. A. Glasgow quashed the appointment of Eddy Ventose, a St. Lucia-born academic and jurist, as a Justice of Appeal of the ECSC with effect from Jan. 8, 2024.
Justice Ventose wrote the 2-1 majority verdict handed down on Feb. 12, 2025, overturning the March 2023 decision of then-High Court judge Esco Henry, now an appeal judge, who had declared the mandate unconstitutional and void.
Justice of Appeal Paul Webster agreed with Ventose, while Justice of Appeal Gerhard Wallbank wrote a dissenting judgment, saying he would have dismissed the government’s appeal.
The vaccine mandate case is awaiting a final determination by the London-based Privy Council, SVG’s highest court.
The ruling last week is likely to re-energise the public debate in SVG, where the vaccine mandate, imposed by the Unity Labour Party administration, is said to have played a major role in the party’s 14-1 defeat at the November 2025 general election.
Hundreds of public sector workers lost their jobs as a result of the mandate.
However, most of them have since returned to their posts under arrangements made by the ULP government and the New Democratic Party administration, which won the November vote.
In December 2025, former Attorney General of Grenada, King’s Counsel James A.L. Bristol, brought a legal challenge before the ECSC seeking judicial review of the Judicial and Legal Services Commission (JLSC) appointment of Ventose as a justice of appeal.
Bristol asked the court to rule that Justice Ventose “has not been a Judge for 5 years as outlined by section 5(2)(a)(i) of the Courts Order nor was he qualified to practice as an advocate or had practiced as an advocate for less than 15 years as is required by Section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Court’s Order”.
Justice Ventose had asked the court to strike out Bristol’s application as an abuse of process, saying that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
However, the court dismissed Justice Ventose’s application in December, paving the way for the trial.
In the July 7 judgment, Justice Glasgow declared, pursuant to section 101 of the Grenada Constitution Order 1973, that Ventose’s appointment is “unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect as he did not meet the qualification requirements set out in Section 5(2) of the Courts Order.
The court, however, held that no issue had been raised concerning Justice Ventose’s “competence, his extensive knowledge of the law, or his widely recognised legal accomplishments”.
Justice Glasgow noted that Bristol had reiterated that position during the hearing.
“The evidence further suggests that, until the Search Committee raised its concerns, the JLSC, Justice Ventose, the Court, the members of the Search Committee, and the public whom he served all proceeded on the common understanding that his appointment was valid.
“There is therefore no basis upon which to conclude that Justice Ventose knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that he was unlawfully occupying the office to which he had been appointed.”
The judge ruled that the de facto officer doctrine applies to the proceedings in which he has sat and to the judgments he has delivered in those matters.
“Those proceedings and judgments are therefore not rendered invalid by reason only of the defect in his appointment,” Justice Glasgow ruled, meaning that Justice Ventose’s ruling in the vaccine mandate and all other cases stand, unless overturned by another court.”
Bristol’s case was essentially that the Supreme Court Order, which establishes the ECSC, says that a person shall not be qualified to be appointed as Chief Justice or a Justice of Appeal unless:
(i) he has been for a period or periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than five years a judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such a court; or
(ii) he is qualified to practise as an advocate in such a court, and has so practised, for a period of, or periods amounting in the aggregate to, not less than 15 years;
All parties agreed that Justice Ventose has not “… been for a period or periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than five years a judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such a court.”
The central issue, therefore, was whether Justice Ventose’s appointment was made in accordance with the requirements.
More specifically, the dispute brought into sharp focus the meaning and scope of the terms “advocate” and “has so practised” as they appear in the relevant section of the law.
Bristol’s case was that the JLSC acted unlawfully and in breach of the law when it appointed Justice Ventose to the Court of Appeal on Jan. 8, 2024.
Bristol argued that Justice Ventose had not “so practised” as an advocate for the requisite period of 15 years at the time of his appointment.
The JLSC maintains the contrary position. It stood by its decision, asserting that it
complied with the relevant section of the law by satisfying itself that Justice Ventose had practised as an advocate for the prescribed period of 15 years prior to his appointment to the Court of Appeal.
For his part, Justice Ventose aligned himself with the JLSC’s stance. He firmly declares that he satisfied the 15-year practice requirement stipulated by the Constitution and that, consequently, the JLSC lawfully appointed him to the office of Justice of Appeal.